In a recent and well-grounded decision rendered on March 3, 2026, in the case Mondelez Argentina S.A. v. Municipality of Puerto Madryn s/ Total Annulment of Individual Administrative Act (Case No. 8/2025), the administrative contentious court of the Province of Chubut ordered the suspension of the effects of a municipal administrative act that had unilaterally assessed an alleged debt for a municipal fee (Advertising and Publicity Rights). At the same time, the court granted an exemption from the requirement of prior payment as a condition for accessing judicial review, considering that the prerequisites for the issuance of the precautionary relief requested by the plaintiff had been satisfied.
The case arose from the judicial challenge to a resolution issued by the Municipality of Puerto Madryn, through which the municipality upheld an assessment of debt for Advertising and Publicity Rights. In response, the plaintiff company filed an administrative contentious action seeking the annulment of the act and, simultaneously, requested the suspension of its enforceability as well as an exemption from the requirement of prior payment of the tax, noting that such requirement is not regulated under provincial legislation.
The court granted the requested precautionary measure, ordering the suspension of the effects of the challenged administrative act and directing the municipality to refrain from initiating enforcement proceedings or imposing precautionary measures aimed at collecting the alleged debt.
In its analysis, the judge recalled that the granting of precautionary measures in proceedings against the Provincial State is subject to a specific legal regime that requires the concurrence of several elements: risk in delay, likelihood of the asserted right, prima facie illegality of the challenged act, absence of direct impairment to the public interest, and the requirement that the suspension of the act does not produce irreversible effects. Within this regulatory framework, the court assessed whether the necessary conditions were met to justify the suspension of the enforceability of the administrative act.
The central focus of the decision concerned the likelihood of the right invoked by the plaintiff, particularly with respect to the absence of the effective provision of the public service that the municipal fee purportedly compensates. Indeed, the validity of such fees is contingent upon the existence of a specific, effective, and individualized state activity rendered to the taxpayer.
In this regard, the judgment emphasized that the doctrine of the Superior Court of Justice of Chubut has repeatedly held that, in the case of municipal fees, an essential prerequisite is proof of the provision of a service individually rendered to the obligated taxpayer, with the administration being in the best position to provide the relevant evidentiary elements.
The court specifically cited the precedent Petrobras Argentina S.A. v. Municipality of Puerto Madryn, in which the province’s highest court reaffirmed that the existence of a fee requires proof of a specific and differentiated state activity in relation to the taxpayer.
In turn, the doctrine of the Superior Court of Justice of Chubut was linked to the criterion established by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation in the case Gasnor S.A. v. Municipality of La Banda, in which the Court held that the legitimacy of municipal fee charges depends upon the effective provision of the service invoked as the cause of the tax obligation.
Following this line of case law, the judge noted that verification of the provision of the advertising control or inspection service constitutes a question of fact that must be proven in each specific case. The court further emphasized that the services that justify the imposition of the fee cannot be confused with the inspection or tax assessment tasks performed by the revenue authority.
Another relevant aspect of the ruling was the analysis of the potential impact of the precautionary measure on the public interest.
In this respect, the court concluded that the temporary suspension of the administrative act would not generate irreversible consequences for the municipality, given that the debt could still be enforced if, upon issuance of the final judgment, the legitimacy of the claimed tax were confirmed.
In other words, the precautionary measure did not imply the extinguishment or waiver of the fiscal credit, but merely postponed its enforceability until the merits of the dispute were resolved.
This decision is particularly significant in the field of municipal taxation, as it reaffirms a well-established principle in case law: the collection of a municipal fee necessarily requires proof of the effective provision of a public service individually rendered to the taxpayer.
The ruling underscores that municipalities may not base the enforceability of such levies solely on presumptions or on inspection activities aimed at determining and collecting a debt, but must demonstrate the existence of the state activity that justifies the tax obligation.
Ultimately, the judgment constitutes a further precedent reinforcing judicial oversight over the legality of local taxes and reiterates that municipal taxing powers are subject to clear limits grounded in the principle of reasonableness and in the requirement of correspondence between the fee imposed and the service actually provided.
Another important point to highlight is that the entire analysis described above was conducted within the framework of a precautionary measure. This confirms the full authority of the judge to examine the validity requirements of the municipal fee at this procedural stage and to exempt the taxpayer from prior payment when seeking judicial protection of its rights against arbitrary claims by municipalities.